One of the many narratives that emerged in the run-up to the epic West Bengal Assembly Election 2021 was that, this is going to be a contest between the genteel, upper-caste, left-leaning Bengali "bhadralok" and the earthy "subalterns" - mostly the OBC, dalits and Adivasis who had been marginalized too long by the former. Most of those who subscribed to this narrative implied two more things: i) the subalterns, being closer to the ground realities, will readily accept the religious appeal of BJP, and ii) being numerically larger, they would propel their favoured party to win. This, in turn, would finally break the stranglehold of the bhadralok over the society of West Bengal, and also lead to its "political mainstreaming" with the rest of India. Many commentators noted that this is a unique situation, as in other parts of the country it is usually the upper castes who prefer the BJP and subalterns prefer Congress or other regional parties.
Friday, 7 May 2021
On the "Bhadralok vs Subaltern" Narrative in Bengal'21
Was this narrative accurate? Clearly not, as the results now indicate. Yet, there are also elements of truth in it. First of all let us examine the case of the Bhadralok. In the imagination of the proponents of this narrative, the bhadraloks live mostly in Kolkata and other cities, read Rabindranath, Shakespeare and Marx, watch Satyajit Ray and Akira Kurosawa movies, and vote for the Left. They have completely dominated the cultural, social and political life of West Bengal since at least a century, and equally detest the backward castes and the right-wing communal/religious assertion. They consider themselves as the only authentic Bengalis and the cream of India, definitely superior to the "uncultured northies". Out of all these characterizations, only one is necessarily true: that they have dominated the cultural, social and political life till at least 2010. But the rest do not appear to be true. While the stereotype of "cultured communist Bengalibabu" is common in India, from personal and anecdotal evidence, I can say that there have always been a wide range of political opinions and social choices among the Bengali bhadralok. There have been dedicated atheist and secular communists, middle class folks suspicious of all politics and politicians, broadly liberal modernists, religious traditionals who despise the communists, those who value economic and material development over everything else, and yes, also right-wing hindus - like SP Mukherjee. There is also a large politically un-opinionated category, who can be influenced through media optics, and also rank opportunists who align themselves with the powerful of the day. Culturally too, there are many bhadraloks who prefer Bollywood over Satyajit Ray and Pink Floyd or Sunidhi Chauhan over Manna De.
The point that the genteel bhadralok of Kolkata have always prefered Left is only a myth. Consider the 5 parliamentary seats around Kolkata. Even at the height of Left rule in 1996, 4 of them went to Congress. In 1998 and 1999, 4 went to TMC and Dum Dum went to BJP. Similarly in 2009, 2011, 2014, 2016 and 2019 TMC swept all. Only in 2004 and 2006 Left won Kolkata while 2001 had a fractured verdict - north Kolkata to Left and South to TMC. Political preference of the bhadraloks was often determined by issues different from ideology. The "Bangals" or partition-era immigrants from East Bengal were mobilized by the Left since 1950s, and they stood behind the party loyally for decades. But the original inhabitants of West Bengal - the "Ghotis" - often preferred Congress/TMC and looked upon the Left as a threat - not because of communist ideology but because of their "Bangal" supporters whom they considered as usurpers. The "Bangals", despite largely supporting the Left, were not necessarily wedded to communist/leftist ideology, and memories of riots and partition co-existed uncomfortably with the Left's call for secularism. No wonder, many "Bangals" and their descendents have shifted to BJP these days, as the out-of-power Left can no longer patronize them. On the other hand, deep misogynist and elitist instincts exist among many of them, as manifested by their disgust for Mamata Banerjee whom they consider as uncultured and "jhee"-class.
While it is known to all that Bhadraloks have dominated the social and cultural spheres of West Bengal, it is rarely realized that this is no longer true. Bhadralok stranglehold over West Bengal's public life has dissipated over the past 10 years or so, not because of any political change but simply because of the large-scale out-migration of Bhadraloks, especially the most talented and capable ones. Since the 1980s, well-educated Bhadraloks have started migrating to other parts of the country or abroad, for career advancement. After economic liberalization in India, bhadraloks have largely abandoned their interest in politics and culture, and responded to the call of material success. The state government's inability/unwillingness to let the private sector boom in the state has meant that the exodus has been exacerbated. Around 2006 Buddhadev Bhattacharya deviated from his professed communist ideals to attract private capital in West Bengal, but his high-handed approach boomeranged and he lost power. But the continued exodus of talented youngsters has meant that West Bengal is visibly less vibrant today than 15 years earlier. For example, the youth-driven Bengali Band Music had become immensely popular in the state during the 2000s decade, but it is now nowhere to be found. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the educational institutes today have less talented faculty/students than earlier. No prominent icon has emerged from the state after Sourav Ganguly, in any field - sports, cinema, music, art, literature, science or politics. In fact, if we consider the posh localities of Kolkata like Lake Gardens, Alipur or Bhowanipur, these days we may find more Hindi-speakers than Bhadraloks. Little wonder,
in 2019 BJP was leading in the Rashbehari assembly segment - a posh residential area. Many bhadraloks who have settled down in Delhi, Bangalore, London or New York for years, have now
merged with the population there and lost interest in the state's affairs.
Now let us come to the "subalterns". It is a fact that bhadralok, during their heydays, looked upon them with disdain and looked to marginalize them, while sometimes romanticizing certain groups like Santhals. Satyajjit Ray, a cultural icon of the state, expressed fascination for adivasi life in his movies like "Agantuk" and "Aranyer Dinratri", but failed to conceal upper-caste pride in his works. However, as the bhadraloks migrated from the state and vacated public life, the "subaltern castes" started taking over. It has been observed by many academics that the caste compositions of public university students has completely changed over the past 20 years, and bhadraloks are now a minority. TMC government's decision to categorize most muslims as OBC has opened up their participation in government education and jobs through reservations. This has had the unfortunate effect of the growth of "structural islamophobia" in the state, as backward caste hindus and muslims are often vying for the limited number of government jobs and college seats. Amid such fierce competition, calls to communal identity can be particularly potent. This is how the state's society has become communalized. The great secular ideals once cherished and celebrated by sections of the bhadralok have unfortunately never been communicated to the "subalterns", due to the snobbery of the bhadraloks. The subalterns, who have co-existed with muslims in the villages for many decades, are familiar with a simple syncretic culture which is definitely secular. However, in some situations material interests end up trumping culture and ideology. This hypothesis can be validated by the post-poll surveys after the 2019 election where BJP made huge inroads in the state. It was found that a large fraction of subaltern hindus have voted for BJP, not because they believe in RSS-style hindutva ideology but only to protest against what they considered as preferential treatment to muslims. If the TMC government can astutely manage this "structural islamophobia", the state can be salvaged. 2021 results indicate that this is already in progress.
If there is one section of the West Bengal populace which is and will remain with BJP, it is the young, less-educated and less-employed Dalit youth. Having never been nurtured by the bhadralok-ruled society, nor mobilized by any political party till 2014, they remained on the fringes. With high aspirations but limited prospects in life, they are ready material for BJP who has mobilized them through Ram Navami rallies and the like. They often travel to the rich western states like Gujarat and Karnataka to work as cooks, labourers or artisans, where they learn Hindutva culture and spread them in West Bengal when they return. It will require special efforts by Dalit leaders like Manoranjan Bapari to recover this demographic from the BJP.
And finally there are the remote rural areas, in places like Jalpaiguri, Alipurduar and Malda, where the state is weak, and RSS has stepped into the vacuum to influence the local populace through sustained social and religious activities. A special case is Habibpur in Malda, where a RSS training facility has existed and grown over many years. Even during the Left rule, this was a seat where BJP often came second with 20-30% vote. Now it is full of saffron flags, religious songs and a BJP stronghold. It will require a new social movement to wean away these populace.